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This is a study of Aristotle's moral philosophy as it is contained in the Nicomachean Ethics. Hardie examines the difficulties of the text; presents a map of inescapable philosophical questions; and brings out the ambiguities and critical disagreements on some central topics, inclduing happiness, the soul, the ethical mean, and the initiation of action.

In a discussion-note in Mind, Father P. M. Farrell, O.P., gave an account, in what he admitted to be an embarrassingly brief compass, of the Thomist doctrine concerning evil. There is one sentence in this discussion which at first glance appears paradoxical. Father Farrell has been arguing that a universe containing ‘corruptible good’ as well as incorruptible is better than one containing ‘incorruptible good’ only. He continues: ‘If, however, they are to manifest this corruptible good, they must be corruptible and (...) they must sometimes corrupt.’ The final words, despite Father Farrell's italics, strike one as expressing, not a self-evident truth, but a non sequitur. The fact that I am capable of committing murder does not entail that I will at some time commit it. It is not immediately obvious that a similar entailment holds in the case of corruption and corruptibility. (shrink)

Aristotle’s analysis of emotion and his moral psychology are discussed, as are the relation of virtue to emotion, the status of animals, human friendship and the subordinate role of slaves and women. Persuasion through words and character also receive attention.

I shall argue that, according to Aristotle, the knowledge we may attain is profoundly qualified by our status as human knowers. Throughout the corpus, Aristotle maintains a separation of knowledge at the broadest level into two kinds, human and divine. The separation is not complete—human knowers may enjoy temporarily what god or the gods enjoy on a continuous basis; but the division expresses a fact about humanity's place in the cosmos, one that imposes strict conditions on what we (...) may know, with what degree of certainty, and in what areas. While passages bearing on human knowledge are familiar, looking at them collectively and in comparison with certain other well known Aristotelian doctrines may significantly affect how we understand the goals of his philosophy and why our hopes for reaching them must be limited. (shrink)

Aristotle, Rhetoric I: A Commentary begins the acclaimed work undertaken by the author, later completed in the second (1988) volume on Aristotle's Rhetoric. The first Commentary on the Rhetoric in more than a century, it is not likely to be superseded for at least another hundred years.

Argues that Heidegger's early reading of Aristotle provides him with a critical resource for addressing the problematic domination of theoretical knowledge in Western civilization.

Recent studies of Aristotle’s meteorology have often focused on questions of scientific methodology rather than on the empirical accuracy of the explanations. Here we wish to focus on Aristotle’s theory of storms, considering them in their historical context and in light of Aristotle’s theoretical commitments, but testing them in terms of their ability to explain the phenomena in question. Aristotle’s approach to storm events follows a general pattern of “outburst” theories proposed by Presocratic thinkers, in which (...) wind, fire, and the like burst out of clouds. Aristotle proposes a two-exhalation theory in which a dry and a moist gas arise by evaporation and can conflict with each other. In Meteorologica II.9 and III.1, he provides his own theory of storms. Modern accounts are hampered by a mistranslation of ‘eknephias’ as “hurricane.” We argue that an eknephias is never a hurricane, but in the first place a theoretical construct meant to account for three distinct phenomena: tuphōn, keraunos, and prēstēr, all of which need to be identified more clearly with actual meteorological phenomena than they have been. We identify appropriate phenomena and also propose a phenomenon corresponding to eknephias, which makes sense of Aristotle’s account. (shrink)

This notice answers two long-running questions of authorship. The first part of the notice addresses the famous question “Utrum Aristoteles sit salvatus” that survives in the manuscript Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 1012, a miscellany of primarily Franciscan texts. On the basis of contextual, textual and thematic parallels, the authorship of the question should be ascribed to Hugh of Neufchâteau, OFM. The second part considers the case of the Evidentiae contra Durandum, whose author, known as Durandellus, Joseph Koch (...) identified with a certain Nicolaus Medensis in 1927. A re-examination of Koch’s reasoning makes this attribution doubtful, and the witness of the original Reportatio of William of Brienne, OFM, shows that the Dominican theologian Durand of Aurillac is more likely the author of the Evidentiae. (shrink)

Matthew Walker’s book argues that contemplation is not useless as “traditionally” claimed, but serves the crucial function of guiding what Walker frequently refers to as human life activities, most importantly the self-maintenance of the human organism. By this phrase, he includes the full range of psychic functions essential to a perishable organism, extending down to nourishment and reproduction. As such, contemplation not only becomes the central organizing principle of Aristotle’s ethics, but also must be understood in connection with (...) class='Hi'>Aristotle’s natural philosophy.The book’s early chapters strike me as following something like the order of the De anima, leading from what is perhaps... (shrink)

A collection of 16 essays which assess the revival of development studies in relation to Aristotle.

Contrary to many contemporary readings of Plato and Aristotle, Hans-Georg Gadamer sees harmony in their thought. A challenge to this reading is that Aristotle criticizes Plato’s forms and the good. Aware of these criticisms, Gadamer understands these two thinkers as having significant commonalities and pursuing related goals. Gadamer’s interpretation is less a historical approach than an attempt to explain and justify aspects of his own philosophical views, in particular those regarding the relation between metaphysics and practical thought. We (...) critically examine Gadamer’s interpretation and consider tensions between its more radical conclusions and a more conventional Platonism. (shrink)

The Life and World of... biographies tell the life-story of key people from history - the part they played in shaping events, and how their lives touched other people.

In De Anima III.8 Aristole asserts that "the soul is in a sense all things" because it becomes whatever is thought or perceived. Yet the relationship between the soul and an object of perception or thought is most likely not one of numerical identity. As Aristotle says, "The stone is not in the soul but, rather, form" . Now if soul-object relations cannot be explained solely in terms of numerical identity, it is incumbent upon Aristotle to state what (...) other sense of identity is being invoked. According to Aristotle, the relation obtaining between the soul and an object of perception or thought is one of representational isomorphism; e.g., just as middle-C may be instantiated both in a piano and in a tuning fork, the salient features of an object of perception or thought may be instantiated in the soul as well as in the extra-mental world. (shrink)

In De Anima III 10, Aristotle proposes a notable tripartite scheme of animal self-locomotion. Though many note that the proximate source of the scheme is in Physics VIII 5 (Ferro 2022; Laks 2020; Polansky 2007; Rapp 2020a; Shields 2016), it is nevertheless surprising that Aristotle chooses a scheme of general locomotion from Physics, rather than choosing some of his specific work there on animal self-motion. Further, the two tripartite schemes don’t line up very precisely. I defend a novel (...) view on which the tripartite schemes are understood as non-fundamental, since their authority rests on a more basic Separability Thesis advanced in Physics VIII, which states that every self-mover has minimally two parts: an unmoved mover and a moved part. While the importance of the Separability Thesis has been frequently noted in the literature (e.g., Morison 2004; Waterlow 1982), its relationship to the tripartite schemes has not been explored. I argue that once the fundamentality of the Separability Thesis is recognized, the tripartite schemes can be understood as two different applications of it and Aristotle’s theory of self-motion from Physics is therefore present, in a veiled way, even in De Anima III 10. Further and finally, the argument provides resources for offering a novel response to worries about the unity of self-movers. (shrink)

The problem of Galileo's logical methodology has long interested scholars. In this volume William A. Wallace offers a solution that is completely unexpected, yet backed by convincing documentary evidence. His analysis starts with an early notebook Galileo wrote at Pisa, appropriating a Jesuit professor's exposition of the Posterior Analystics of Aristotle, and ends with one of the last letters Galileo wrote, stating that in logic he has been a Peripatetic all his life. Wallace's detective work unearths the complete (...) logic course from which the notebook was excerpted, then proceeds to show how its terminology and methodology continue to surface in Galileo's later writings in which he founds his new sciences of the heavens and of local motion. The result is a tour de force that commends itself not only to Galileo's scholars and to logicians, philosophers, and historians, but to anyone interested in the epistemic roots of modern science. (shrink)

When "Aristotle on Emotion" was first published it showed how discussion within Plato's Academy led to a better understanding of emotional response, and how that understanding influenced Aristotle's work in rhetoric, poetics, politics and ethics. The subject has been much discussed since then: there are numerous articles, anthologies and large portions of books on emotion and related topics. In a new epilogue to this second edition, W.W. Fortenbaugh takes account of points raised by other scholars and clarifies some (...) of his earlier thoughts, focusing on the central issue: how Aristotle conceived of emotional response. Among other matters, he considers laughter, emotion in relation to belief and appearance, the effect of emotion on judgement, and the involvement of pain and pleasure in emotional response. (shrink)

William of Ockham (d. 1347) was among the most influential and the most notorious thinkers of the late Middle Ages. In the twenty-seven questions translated in this volume, most never before published in English, he considers a host of theological and philosophical issues, including the nature of virtue and vice, the relationship between the intellect and the will, the scope of human freedom, the possibility of God's creating a better world, the role of love and hatred in practical reasoning, (...) whether God could command someone to do wrong, and more. In answering these questions, Ockham critically engages with the ethical thought of such predecessors as Aristotle, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and John Duns Scotus. Students and scholars of both philosophy and historical theology will appreciate the accessible translations and ample explanatory notes on the text. Eric W. Hagedorn is Associate Professor of Philosophy at St. Norbert College, Wisconsin. He has published a number of articles and book reviews on medieval philosophy of mind, language, and logic in journals including Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy and Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. (shrink)